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The risks of Russia’s data localisation laws 
Analysis of Russia’s new data sovereignty law reveals concerns 
over the country’s long term economic and political stability. 
New Russian legislation requires foreign organisations to conduct all primary 
processing of customer and client data within Russia’s territorial borders. Data may 
be transferred abroad under certain conditions, but many firms see this new legal 
and regulatory instrument as inimical to their commercial interests and are 
considering their options for continued operation in Russian markets. Russia is not 
alone in its new commitment to “data localisation”, but it is unclear how this new 
directive serves its economic and political objectives. 
Sovereign Data explores Russian data localisation policy and its implications for 
Russian economic growth and political stability. 
 
Personal data governance 
Russia’s new data localisation law amends and augments existing legislation which 
protects the collection and processing of Russian citizens’ personal data — defined 
as any information that relates directly or indirectly to a physical person, although 
there is little specific guidance on what categories of data this includes. Federal Law 
No. 242-FZ, which came into effect on 1 September 2015, seeks to clarify the 
procedures for “personal data processing in information and telecommunications 
networks”.1  
The new law does not restrict the right or ability of foreign organisations to collect, 
structure or store the personal data of Russian citizens, nor does it affect their 
access to this data from abroad, but it does ban the “recording, systemisation, 
accumulation, storage, modification (updating, alteration) and retrieval of Russian 
citizens’ personal data” using data processing services physically located outside 
Russia. This will not be retrospectively applied, and so data collected before 1 
September 2015 can still be stored abroad. Any further data collected under these 
six categories must be stored within Russia itself. 
This requirement puts the onus on foreign organisations doing business in Russia to 
comply with domestic data protection legislation regardless of where they are 
physically situated. Companies located in Russia, wholly or in part, will be subject to 
on-site audits of data processing. Those situated outside Russia but which target 
Russian users will be required to employ data processing services located within 
territorial Russia that can be more easily inspected. This means any foreign entity 
continuing to do business involving Russian citizens must have a physical base in 
Russia. The law therefore seeks to exclude unwilling organisations, whilst physically 
incorporating compliant companies within its sovereign territory. 
 
Sanctions 
The principal agent of the revised data protection regime is the state media 
regulator, Roskomnadzor, which has primary responsibility for data protection under 
the aegis of the Russian Ministry of Communications and Mass Media. Any party 
wishing to process the personal data of Russian citizens must inform 
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both the identification of data infrastructures developed by foreign entities and the 
development of an inspection regime tailored to audit them. Non-compliant 
organisations will be added to a “Register of Violators of Personal Data Subjects’ 
Rights” and may attract sanctions imposed by Roskomnadzor and the courts.  
The principal proposed sanction is the blocking of foreign websites providing 
services to Russian consumers and clients. Roskomnadzor has extensive 
experience and capabilities in this field and is Russia’s primary internet censor, 
backed by wide-ranging legislation which seeks to restrict internet content. Such 
tools can be easily applied to block the web assets of companies on 
Roskomnadzor’s blacklist. These tools are imperfect and can be evaded by 
sophisticated internet users, however most foreign companies unable to operate 
legally in Russia would likely be unable to operate at all. Extensive technical 
infrastructure exists for comprehensive deep packet inspection (DPI) of internet 
traffic and the Russian government exercises control over internet “choke points”.2 
The threats of website blocking are therefore neither idle nor hypothetical and may 
incentivise compliance with the data localisation law. 
Interestingly, Russia has framed the new law with specific reference to European 
data protection legislation, particularly the controversial “right to be forgotten” 
provision of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive. This concept has been 
part of European law since 1995, but a recent ruling reaffirms the right of the 
individual under certain conditions to request that their personal information be 
removed from the internet.3 Russia’s new data localisation law gives Russian 
citizens the ability to trigger “right to be forgotten” proceedings through the courts. 
As in Europe, the concern is that this instrument may be abused: instead of 
protecting citizens from unwarranted and undesired exposure, it may be deployed to 
promote and protect vested interests.4  
 
Economics of data localisation 
There has been some confusion about the precise application and effects of the 
data localisation law. The Ministry of Communications published a non-binding 
commentary on the legislation in August 2015, only weeks before its 
implementation.5 This clarified many issues of liability and exemption, notably that 
airlines would not be required to comply as this would breach international 
conventions on air travel and aviation security. The new law is generally respectful 
of Russia’s international treaty obligations and international law, but the principal 
objection to data localisation remains commercial rather than normative. 
Data migration is costly and the prospect of transferring primary databases to 
Russia is unattractive to foreign companies. Some will bear those costs as the price 
of operating in Russian markets, but others are likely to leave. Google, Facebook 
and Twitter—all of which have established offices in Russia—were disputing the 
time-frame for compliance until the eve of the law’s implementation and seem to 
have elicited a stay of inspection until January 2016.6 Big companies such as these 
have leverage in Moscow not available to smaller enterprises, but they have yet to 
make firm decisions on the future of their Russian operations. Like many others, 
they may elect to restructure in a manner that will affect the ability of Russian firms 
to capitalise on the global market in cloud services and IT support.7  
Those seeking to comply with the law may find it cost-effective to contract with local 
partners rather than risk the costs of physical relocation. This presents opportunities 
for domestic data processing companies, a consideration surely not far from 
Russian government thinking and in keeping with its general drift towards import 
substitution.8 This policy, partly fuelled by deteriorating relations with the US and its 
imposition of economic sanctions, would be a long term challenge for any country, 
let alone one with a problematic history of protectionism and economic stagnation. 
In August 2015, the Russian Duma took steps to approve an import substitution plan 
for software which may help to offset some of the losses caused by data 
localisation.9 However, the European Centre for International Political Economy 
calculates that new data localisation requirements will cost Russia RUB 286 billion 
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(GBP 3.7 billion; USD 5.7 billion), a figure which allows for government subsidies 
and other positive effects on the domestic data processing market. For this reason, 
the decision has been described as a “self-imposed sanction”.10  
 
Outlook 
What, if anything, does Russia stand to gain from data localisation? The first point to 
consider is that Russia is not alone in seeking to assert data sovereignty this way. In 
the last two years, at least twenty states have proposed data localisation, often as a 
means of protecting against foreign government intervention of the type revealed by 
Edward Snowden in 2013. Nor are global technology companies the victims: many 
sell data sovereignty as a service, particularly to curry market favour in places like 
Germany and Brazil, which reacted to the Snowden disclosures with data 
localisation proposals of their own.11  
Russian data localisation is tied up with Putin’s accusations, inter alia, that the 
internet is a “CIA project”.12   As previously reported in Sovereign Data, whether he 
truly believes this, is less important than the role of data localisation as an 
expression of Russian discontent with perceived US internet hegemony.13 The 
logical extension of the argument is to further demarcate the borders around the 
Russian internet and ensure they are patrolled diligently against external subversion. 
This is not necessarily an authoritarian reflex, but history suggests that “walling-up” 
the internet goes hand-in-glove with domestic surveillance and political control. This 
may serve short-term political ends but is unsustainable if Russia’s economy is 
affected by growing insularity from global markets which are increasingly reliant on 
the relatively unfettered exchange of information.  
Internet scholar Rebecca MacKinnon notes there is always friction where nation-
state sovereignty and the “commercial sovereigns” of the internet interact.14 With 
regard to Russia’s new data localisation law, however, the risk is that it will be 
detrimental for all companies wishing to do business in Russia. Investors and 
researches will need to be mindful of whether this presents merely a “speed bump 
on the information superhighway”, as the old internet cliché has it, or a more 
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